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Taiwan Strait crisis primarily by Taiwan's air superiority and the difficulty of
mounting an amphibious attack-not by pressure from Washington. Likewise,
according to Crawford, Taiwan was probably "deterred from declaring
independence by the fearsome consequences of a Chinese missile barrage on
Taipei," not by any threat to the future supply of U.S. arms to the island (p.
196). What do these facts imply regarding the capacity of the U.S. to effect
pivotal deterrence? Crawford seems undecided over whether strategic
ambiguity is a sensible approach or whether--counter to his theory-strategic
clarity may be more appropriate. The defensive advantages Taiwan enjoys
make the prospect of its declaring independence a genuine danger, especially
given the recent electoral successes of the more confrontational Democratic
Progressive Party and the ambitious program of President Chen Shui-bian.
Taiwanese leaders may see the blurred lines of American support more as an
invitation to adventurism and risk-taking than a robust deterrent. The United
States could still act as a decisive pivot, but at some point remaining aloof
may signal nonintervention, in which case the local military balance of power
will predominate.
In sum, Pivotal Deterrence is a well-written and thoughtful book on a
topic which has struggled to free itself from a Cold War mindset. It features
impressively detailed case studies that are a riveting read and a useful primer
for those unfamiliar with the historical events. Crawford's intuition that third
parties can be decisive in determining the outcome of crises is accurate, but he
overreaches in attempting to develop an overarching theory to explain how
states ought to practice pivotal deterrence. The ability and desire of pivot
states to intervene is all part of the balance of power, and to focus exclusively
on one party in this balance is to miss the forest for the trees.

Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War. By Philip B.
Heymann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. Pp. xiii, 210. Price:
$24.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Nicholas Stephanopoulos.
Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George
W. Bush has argued that America is a nation at war. "Our war on terror... is
only begun," he declared in the 2002 State of the Union address. "History has
called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and
our privilege to fight freedom's fight." ' As the 2004 presidential campaign
commenced, Bush labeled himself a "war president" in a closely watched
Meet the Press interview. 2 Meanwhile, Vice President Dick Cheney attacked
the Democratic Party nominee, Senator John Kerry, for "embrac[ing] the
strategy of the 1990s" and "treat[ing] attacks on our nation primarily as
matters of law enforcement and intelligence." 3
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Harvard Law School Professor Philip Heymann thinks the Bush
administration has it wrong. In his new book, Terrorism, Freedom, and
Security: Winning Without War, Heymann argues that "war" is a misleading
and inaccurate metaphor for the United States' struggle against terrorism. This
terminology, according to Heymann, obscures the many U.S. policy options
short of military force, encourages the government to sacrifice civil liberties in
the name of enhanced security, and damages U.S. relations with other
countries. Coming at a point when the Bush administration's handling of the
terrorist threat is perhaps the pivotal issue in American public life, Heymann's
critique of Bush's foreign policy is exceptionally timely-and makes an
excellent outline for Democrats to follow as the 2004 campaign progresses.
Unfortunately, Heymann's prescriptions for the array of steps that the United
States should take to combat terrorism are weaker than his critical assessment
of the actions that it is taking. Policy-makers will find little guidance in this
book about how better to make the agonizing choices between freedom and
safety, or between amicable foreign relations and the unilateral pursuit of
American interests.
Heymann most explicitly criticizes the bellicose terminology of Bush's
"war on terror" in the first part of his book. "'War,"' he writes, "is neither a
persuasive description of the situation we face nor an adequate statement of
our objectives" (p. 19). The many differences between what Heymann
considers "real" wars and the contemporary struggle against terrorism include:
the massive commitment of attention, energy, and resources demanded by real
wars, far outweighing the more manageable burden of combating terrorism;
the primacy enjoyed by the military in real wars, as opposed to the centrality
of the intelligence agencies in antiterrorist efforts; and the temporary nature of
real wars, compared to the indefinite terrorist threat (p. 1). The language of
war is also unhelpful, according to Heymann, because it simplifies the
multifaceted danger of terrorism-which includes not only the threat of
spectacular September 11-style attacks but also smaller-scale bombings,
cyberterrorism, and other menaces. Inaccurate rhetoric thus puts Washington
policymakers in a myopic haze, and they become "less likely to develop
different remedies for different dangers" (p. 26). Furthermore, casting the
fight against terrorism in warlike terms implies greater knowledge of the
enemy than the United States in fact possesses. It also grants adversaries "the
dignity of parity" with the United States (p. 27).

In this section, and indeed throughout the book, Heymann adopts an
overly formalistic view of the term "war." Just as the war on poverty was
fought without sending tanks into inner-city ghettoes and rural Appalachia, so
too the war on terror need not resemble the Battle of the Bulge. Even though
the term can sometimes refer to all-encompassing struggles for survival, it can
also identify a wide range of lesser conflicts with varying degrees of
conventionality; it is, fundamentally, a flexible concept amenable to metaphor.
Still, Heymann's terminological critique has real force. In addition to
highlighting the many problematic assumptions conveyed by a simple
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linguistic choice, it arms critics of the administration with a much-needed
rejoinder to the argument that September 11 "changed everything."
In the final part of the book, Heymann explores the potential negative
consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy for civil liberties at
home and U.S. relations with its allies abroad. In the chapter on civil liberties,
Heymann locates possible antiterrorism actions in three intersecting
categories: steps that reduce the probability and harm of terrorism, steps
dangerous to democratic liberties or national unity, and steps that mitigate
public fear and anger. The most difficult policies to appraise are those that
simultaneously combat terrorism and undermine civil liberties. For such
actions, writes Heymann, Americans can do little but rely on the wisdom and
courage of their elected leaders. Unfortunately, the choices the Bush
administration has made-authorizing the indefinite detention of persons
suspected of terrorist involvement, creating military tribunals outside the
criminal justice system, and shunning legislative involvement and judicial
review-indicate a desire "to go as far as legally possible in protecting even
limited amounts of security without consideration of the long-term costs in
democratic freedoms" (p. 90).
With regard to U.S. foreign relations, similarly, Heymann argues that
"the Bush administration has . . . been consuming-not building-that
intangible capital" that accrues from the respect and admiration of other
countries (p. 122). Though one would never know it from the administration's
bravado, this intangible capital is invaluable. International cooperation is
required to accomplish many of America's most important goals, and
American "soft power" rests largely on the values the United States has
historically represented on the world stage.
Like the earlier section on the inappropriate "war" rhetoric, these policy
chapters mount a persuasive critique of the Bush administration's handling of
the struggle against terrorism. Heymann is weaker, though, when he turns to
considering how to strike a more appropriate balance between individual
liberties, cordial diplomacy, and national security. The critical question of
what to do "when there is a true conflict between greater security and
preserving historical democratic freedoms" produces only the answer that "we
must do our best to choose wisely" (p. 90). Heymann also outlines various
proposals that give rise to constitutional concerns-increasing the
government's surveillance powers over aliens, creating a criminal incitement
offense, and making membership in certain groups a crime-but fails to reach
conclusions about the relative merit of any of these steps. And although he
presents the many advantages of cooperative multilateralism, he never
discusses what weight they should be given when the interests of the United
States and its allies diverge.
In between the initial chapters on the Bush administration's faulty
rhetoric and the final chapters on its faulty policies, Heymann attempts to
make his own policy prescriptions in order "to develop as complete a menu as
possible of ways to recreate safety and reduce fear" (p. 37). By this measure,
he clearly succeeds. He offers an extremely comprehensive list of actions that
Washington can take to combat terrorism: reduce enthusiasm abroad for
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attacks; deter attacks through law enforcement and military force; deny
terrorists access to potential targets, gather intelligence on suspicious
individuals and groups; disrupt plots through criminal prosecution and
detention; and so on. The trouble, though, is that a thorough menu of
counterterrorist options is not especially useful. Many of the steps outlined
have already been taken. Others are described at such a high level of
generality (e.g. "showing concern for the well-being-the nutrition, health,
education, governance, and human rights-of Muslim populations around the
world") as to be effectively useless (p. 44). Most important, Heymann
neglects in these chapters to consider the implications of his different
proposals for civil liberties and foreign relations. As a result, the reader is
unable to decide whether some or all of Heymann's policies should be
implemented-because, as he later explains, the potential to reduce terrorism
must always be weighed against possible corrosive consequences for freedom
and international cooperation.
Terrorism, Freedom, and Security therefore meets the first of the two
requirements for any robust alternative to the Bush administration's
counterterrorism approach. That is, it adeptly points out the many deficiencies
of the "war on terror" as understood and executed by President Bush: the
unhelpful terminology of warfare; the excessive focus on short-term danger
reduction; the erosion of civil liberties; and the damage to U.S. diplomacy and
its perception abroad. Heymann, however, does not meet the second crucial
requirement for any new counterterrorism strategy: a precise description of
what steps it would entail; what values it would secure; and how it would
differ from the status quo. Although readers will have to look elsewhere for a
coherent and persuasive alternative to Bush's war on terror, this book offers a
successful critique of the current administration's policy, and contains many
ideas that will inevitably become part of any rival approach.
After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy. By Noah
Feldman. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003. Pp: 260. Price:
$24.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Sameera Fazili.
Are Islam and democracy compatible? Even if so, can a democratic
system survive if Islamist parties are allowed to participate? The answer to
both questions is yes, according to Noah Feldman, Assistant Professor of Law
at New York University Law School who served as Senior Advisor for
Constitutional Law to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority's Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq. In After Jihad,Feldman
gives a whirlwind overview of politics in the contemporary Muslim world in
order to convince his reader, and wider policy circles, to accept his optimistic
prognosis.
If Feldman is right, the stakes in Muslim countries today are higher than
at any time in the past twenty-five years. He believes political Islam has
moved from an era of espousing violent revolutionary rhetoric-leading in the
most extreme case to the 1979 Iranian revolution-into a "post-Jihad" era

